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Abstract. This paper argues that there is a general constraint on the evolution of culture. This
constraint – what I am calling the Fundamental Constraint – must be satisfied in order for a cultural
system to be adaptive. The Fundamental Constraint is this: for culture to be adaptive there must be
a positive correlation between the fitness of cultural variants and their fitness impact on the
organisms adopting those variants. Two ways of satisfying the Fundamental Constraint are
introduced, structural solutions and evaluative solutions. Because of the limitations on these solu-
tions, this constraint helps explain why there is not more culture in nature, why the culture that
does exist has the form it has, and why complex, cumulative culture is restricted to the human
species.
Introduction
It might seem that it is generally better to be cultured,1 that is, that individuals
would be better off if they possessed the ability and disposition to socially
transmit information. After all, individuals of a species exhibiting the social
transmission of information can potentially acquire information at a lower
cost, more reliably, and faster. Instead of risking dangerous trial and error
learning – learning, for example, which species are predators and what to do to
avoid them – individuals can readily learn this invaluable information from
their conspecifics.
But being cultured also has its costs. There are reasons why learning indi-
vidually or being ‘‘hard wired’’ might be preferable to social learning. For
example, Boyd and Richerson (1985) point out that if environmental change is
too fast or too slow, cultural learning can be deleterious: an individual in a
rapidly changing environment who gets old information from a conspecific is
likely to be worse off than if it used trial and error learning. Similarly, in a
rather stable environment it is likely to be advantageous to be hard wired to
1 For the purposes of this paper, I will employ a broad definition of ‘culture’, which includes all
non-genetic forms of inheritance. This is not to imply that I take this to be the best definition of
culture. Instead, I am applying this definition because of its simplicity and clarity. Other definitions
of culture would require substantial support and clarification, which is beyond the scope of this
paper.
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behave in fixed ways instead of learning (both because there is an inherent cost
to learning and because conspecific models can be unreliable or deceptive).
There are also many traits – such as the ability to imitate and innovate –
whose absence can act to constrain the evolution of culture.2 Recognizing that
culture is adaptive in some ways, but maladaptive or constrained in other ways,
leads one to ask whether there is an overarching framework in which to
understand the evolution of culture. In this paper, I introduce a general con-
straint – what I am calling the Fundamental Constraint on the evolution of
culture – which provides a way of explaining why culture has arisen in some
lineages but not others, as well as explaining why culture, especially complex,
cumulative culture is not more common than it is.
Constraints on the evolution of culture
Before introducing the Fundamental Constraint, I will brieﬂy map out the
diversity of constraints on the evolution of culture. There are six dimensions in
which something can act as a constraint: the Transformation, Reception,
Implementation, Propagation, Production, and Evaluation (TRIPPE for short)
of cultural variants can be constrained. The presence of any one of these
constraints can eliminate the adaptiveness (or even possibility) of culture. Let’s
look at some examples of constraints on culture and see which TRIPPE
dimensions they occupy.
Imitation
Many forms of culture require imitation3 and the ability to imitate can be
cognitively and perceptually demanding. A lack of culture – certain kinds of
culture, at least – might therefore be explained in terms of a lack of certain
2 Both ‘evolution’ and ‘culture’ are polysemous. Thus, the phrase ‘cultural evolution’ is multiply
ambiguous. The evolution of a trait can mean the origin of a trait or the change of a preexisting
trait. ‘Culture’ can refer to an ensemble of cultural variants (e.g., American culture), particular
cultural variant types (e.g., driving on the right side of the road), a particular cultural variant token
(e.g., Martha’s way of tying her shoelaces, learned from her mother), or to a cultural system as a
whole (e.g., songbirds exhibit culture but roaches do not). In producing a framework in which to
understand the evolution of culture, I am chiefly concerned with evolution in the sense of origin
(though maintenance is also important) and culture in the sense of a cultural system as a whole.
Thus, a constraint on the evolution of culture (in this sense) concerns the origin (and maintenance)
of cultural systems. The constraint I propose shows what it takes for cultural systems (as a whole)
are to be adaptive, i.e., why it would be advantageous to learn how to behave from conspecifics
instead of learning individually or being hard wired.
3 There is much debate whether ‘‘true’’ imitation (Thorpe 1963) occurs in nature and some have
even argued that the human imitative ability is unique and different in kind from the copying found
among other animals, and that this ability is necessary for complex, cumulative culture (Tomasello
et al. 1993; Tomasello 1999). For a discussion of the concept of imitation see Whiten and Ham
(1992) and Byrne and Russon (1998).
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kinds of imitation. Imitation minimally requires that an individual observe
another individual and (thereby) produce a behavior that correlates with the
observed behavior. Thus, the TRIPPE dimensions affected by this constraint
could be either reception or implementation (or both). If an individual cannot
perceive the behaviors of others or store this information (reception), imitation
is impossible. Likewise, if the individual cannot put this information to use
(implementation), imitation is impossible.
Innovation
Even if members of a species are able to imitate ﬂawlessly, it does not follow
that imitating others is adaptive. Although a species might be able to imitate
behavioral variants of others, there could be a paucity of good behavioral
variants available to be imitated. One reason for this is that the species might
not have a propensity to innovate.4 If one’s conspecifics rarely produce ben-
eficial innovations, then it will be better not to copy them. There are a number
of reasons why a species might not produce beneficial innovations. One is that
the species lacks neurological structures labile enough to produce behavioral
novelty, or that the novel behaviors that are produced tend to be worse than
the status quo, e.g., they tend to be mistakes. This is an example of a constraint
on transformation or production (or both).
Social structure
Even if members of a species are able to imitate ﬂawlessly and regularly produce
beneﬁcial innovations, culturemay still not evolve. This is because the organisms
need to be suﬃciently social for cultural variants to be able to spread among the
members. Social structure is an example of a constraint on propagation.5
Discrimination
Even if individuals are able to innovate and imitate and there is an amenable
social structure, if the individuals are not disposed to adopt the good variants,
then it may not be good to be cultured. (As we will see below, although it is not
always necessary that individuals are able to make such discriminations, there
is a large class of cases in which it is necessary.) Individuals can make these
discriminations to determine the variants that they will adopt or the variants
4 For a discussion of the concept of innovation, see Ramsey et al. (submitted) and Laland and
Reader (2003).
5 For an example from anthropology, see Henrich’s (2004) model of the structure of social
transmission and the explanation of maladaptive losses of cultural variants in the case of Tasmania.
403
others (e.g., their oﬀspring) will adopt.6 This is an example of a constraint on
evaluation.
The Fundamental Constraint
The constraints listed above can each act to keep a species from evolving a
cultural system. And they can help to explain why some species have never
evolved a cultural system, while others have. But what is lacking from these
explanations is an overarching framework, a way to say, in general, what it
takes for a cultural system to be adaptive. For this, we need to understand
what I am calling the Fundamental Constraint on the evolution of culture.
The Fundamental Constraint is this: for culture to be adaptive there must be a
positive correlation between the fitness of cultural variants and their fitness
impact on the organisms adopting7 those variants. Furthermore, any cultural
system that has a stronger correlation of this kind than another cultural system
will be more adaptive, ceteris paribus. The Fundamental Constraint employs
two concepts – the fitness of cultural variants and the fitness impact of those
variants – that need explication. The fitness of a cultural variant is based on the
probability of the variant being received, implemented, and propagated by the
organisms in the population. Some variants will have a higher fitness than
others, but this does not mean that those variants are better for the organisms
that adopt them. They might simply be easier to implement (perhaps they are
less complex), more likely to propagate (perhaps they are more likely to be
exhibited in social situations), or more likely to be received (perhaps due purely
to the attractiveness of the variant) than an alternate variant. (These are
examples of what Boyd and Richerson call biased transmission.) By the fitness
impact of cultural variants on organisms, I mean the change in the organism’s
fitness conferred by the adoption of a particular cultural variant.8
There are two kinds of cultural systems: facultative cultural systems and
obligate cultural systems. A facultative cultural system is one in which the
organisms can abstain from engaging in cultural transmission. If the system is
facultative, the zero point on the horizontal axis in Figure 1 represents the
organism not adopting a cultural variant (or adopting a variant with no fitness
impact). Thus, a point on the left side of the graph represents a cultural variant
6 For a discussion of the importance of these kinds of evaluations in cultural systems, see Castro
and Toro (2004).
7 To adopt a variant is to receive and implement it.
8 This of course requires that the fitness of organisms be able to change over time. Although I
have argued elsewhere that the fitness property in the theory of natural selection cannot change over
time (see Ramsey 2006), I do think that there is a fitness concept (what I call Flux Fitness) that does
satisfy this requirement. Flux Fitness is based on an organism’s instantaneous probability of sur-
viving and reproducing. If one is troubled by a dynamic fitness concept, the horizontal axis can be
reinterpreted to be the difference in fitness between two distinct organisms O1 and O2 that differ
only in their probability of adopting the cultural variant c represented on the vertical access, i.e., the
values on the horizontal axis in Figure 1 are x O1)x O2, where p(O1 accepting c) = 1 and p(O2
accepting c) = 0.
404
that is worse for the organism than not adopting any variant, whereas a point
on the right represents a variant that is better than adopting no variant at all.
An obligate cultural system is one in which the organisms cannot abstain from
engaging in cultural transmission; they are forced by their circumstances to
adopt one cultural variant or another. An example of such a system is vertical
diet inheritance in rats (see Galef 1977). The fetal rats absorb the chemicals
from the food consumed by their mother and thereby inherit preferences for
this food. This is an obligate system since the rats cannot opt out of this
inheritance. Although it is true that rats could evolve to be uninfluenced by the
diet of their mother, such a change requires evolutionary change and cannot
arise during the development of an individual rat. It is this failure to be able to
opt out during development that makes something an example of obligate
cultural transmission. For obligate cultural systems, the fitness values repre-
sented on the horizontal axis in Figure 1 will be relative to the pool of cultural
variants, and the variant that is the worst to adopt can be arbitrarily set to
zero. (This means that there will be no negative values on the horizontal axis
for obligate systems. This is not a problem, since the important thing is not the
absolute value on the horizontal axis, but rather the relationship between the
values on the horizontal and vertical axes.)
A variant in the lower left side of the left quadrant (‘a’ in Figure 1) is one
that is highly deleterious for the individual that adopts it and has a positive
(though low) probability of being passed on. A culture of celibacy, drug
addiction, or the consumption of a tasty though toxic fruit could occupy point
a. If such a variant arises, it can be made to conform to the Fundamental
Constraint, either by decreasing the xc (represented by the solid arrow in
Figure 1), increasing the DxO (represented by the dashed arrow), or by
changing both xc and DxO in any combination that brings point a closer to
the correlation line or decreases DxO to 0. With the fruit example, increasing
∆ωO
ωc
a
c
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1
1
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Figure 1. x = fitness; xc = cultural variant fitness; DxO = the fitness impact on the organism
of adopting the variant. The diagonal line represents a perfect correlation between xc and DxO.
Points a, b, and c represent variants that deviate from the correlation line. The arrows illustrate
ways of correcting this deviation by a change in DxO (the dashed arrows) or xc (the solid arrows).
The deviation can also be corrected through a change in both DxO and xc (this is not illustrated).
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the DxO could be accomplished by the addition of a method of detoxifying the
fruit; decreasing the xc could be accomplished by simply refusing to eat the
fruit. Variant b is highly likely to be passed on and confers a positive, though
moderate, boost to the organism’s fitness. Variant c is very good for the
organism that adopts it, but has a low fitness and is thus unlikely to spread. An
example of variant c is the consumption of a species of insipid but nutritious
nut. One way of bringing this variant in line with the correlation line is to
increase the desirability of eating this kind of nut, perhaps through a method of
processing the nut prior to consumption (this change would be along the solid
arrow). If the Fundamental Constraint is satisfied, i.e., if the correlation rep-
resented by Figure 1 is maintained, then individuals in the population will tend
to adopt the best variants and, for facultative systems, it will tend to be better
to adopt a cultural variant then to adopt none at all. If the situation were
otherwise, if, say, the slope of the line were negative instead of positive, the
worst variants would become the most popular. Additionally, because delete-
rious variants are bound to arise, these variants, being the fittest, would spread
through the population and make it worse to be cultured than not.
In proposing the Fundamental Constraint, I am not claiming that in cultural
systems variants must all fall on the correlation line. Rather, the claim is one
about the overall structure of the population of cultural variants. It could be
the case that for some particular cultural system, the ﬁttest variants are neutral.
This is not a problem as long as this deviation from the correlation line is oﬀset
by other variants: a cultural system will not be adaptive if all of the variants are
neutral. I am claiming, however, that for such a system with the ﬁttest variants
being neutral, the system will be more adaptive if the fittest variants are also the
most fitness enhancing for the organisms, ceteris paribus.
Now that we have seen that there is a Fundamental Constraint, let’s turn to
the question of how this constraint can be satisﬁed.
Ways of satisfying the constraint
In order to satisfy the constraint, there must be some structure in place, or
some force, that engenders and maintains the correlation between the ﬁtness of
cultural variants and their ﬁtness impact on the organisms adopting those
variants. There are two ways to satisfy the Fundamental Constraint, what I am
calling structural solutions and evaluative solutions.
Structural solutions
Structural solutions are solutions that shape the way in which cultural variants
spread through the population, but are not based on any organisms’ evaluation
of their own ﬁtness, the ﬁtness of others, or the potential ﬁtness beneﬁt of
adopting cultural variants. It is commonly believed that a major diﬀerence
between genetic and cultural systems is that unlike genetic systems, in which
organisms do not need to evaluate their own alleles or the alleles of others (in
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order to ﬁgure out, say, whether their alleles are better than their neighbor’s),9
cultural systems require that organisms evaluate their own cultural variants or
the variants of conspecifics (in order to determine, for example, which variant
is the best one to copy). By pointing out that there are purely structural
solutions, I am arguing against this claim.10
One structural solution is for all cultural inheritance to occur vertically (i.e.,
from biological parent to oﬀspring only). There are two kinds of vertical
inheritance, one – fixed vertical inheritance – in which the variant is inherited
from only one parent and this parent always possesses just one variant. This
satisfies the Fundamental Constraint because the only way a cultural variant
can become fitter is for it to boost the fitness of the organism that adopts it. An
example of this would be offspring learning to forage from their mother. She is
presenting them with just one model for how to forage, and the better the
foraging strategy, the fitter the individuals will tend to be.
A slightly more complex case – flexible vertical inheritance – is vertical inher-
itance in which the offspring are exposed to multiple, competing variants from
their parents. An example would be both parents acting as models for the for-
aging strategies of their offspring and each offspring adopting just one of the
strategies. In a system such as this, there is the possibility of a worse (for the
organism) variant winning out over a better one. (This is analogous to meiotic
drive.) If one foraging strategy is simpler, for example, it might be easier to learn
than themore complex one. This could confer a higher probability of adoption of
the simpler strategy even if the strategy is less profitable.11 Although this kind of
learning bias canmilitate against the satisfaction of the Fundamental Constraint,
theFundamentalConstraintwill still be satisfied if the selection pressure for good
foraging strategies swamps the learning bias. And since the individuals with good
strategies will tend to be the ones that choose the best of the competing variants,
therewill be strong selection against these sorts of learningbiases. Because of this,
vertical transmission systems generally satisfy the constraint.12
9 In sexual selection, of course, individuals often make mating choices founded on (genetically
based) phenotypic trait differences.
10 Although some structural solutions require cognitive sophistication, others clearly do not.
Sterelny (2006, 142) claims that ‘‘... sucking information out of parental minds is not a dumb, blind
process.’’ While this is often the case (especially in humans) it need not be. The above example of
diet inheritance in rats is an example of this.
11 There is, however, a cost associated with the ability to adopt complex variants. This ability
might require larger, more complex nervous systems. Thus, the adoption of a simpler and osten-
sibly less optimal variant might be more adaptive than having to build bigger brains to make the
adoption of more complex variants possible.
12 Genetic inheritance is of course purely vertical (at least for multicellular organisms), and the
Fundamental Constraint helps to show why it is good for organisms to possess such a system: if the
transmission is vertical and the variants always come from a single parent, or if they come from
either parent (but which parent the variant comes from is determined stochastically), then the
constraint is automatically satisfied. Although I am considering the Fundamental Constraint only
for the case of culture, I would argue that it is a constraint on inheritance mechanisms in general,
not just cultural systems.
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Horizontal and oblique transmission systems,13 on the other hand, do not
automatically satisfy the constraint, i.e., a cultural variant can be fit without it
conferring a fitness advantage on the organism that adopts it. This does not
mean that only systems of vertical transmission satisfy the constraint. There
are a number of learning strategies that act as structural solutions for hori-
zontal and oblique transmission systems. There is, in fact, an indefinite number
of such strategies,14 but many of them are unstable or unlikely to evolve. For a
behavioral strategy to count as a structural solution, it cannot require that the
organisms make assessments of the fitness of their self or their conspecifics.
One such strategy is copy old individuals. This strategy can satisfy the constraint
if the variants affect the survivorship of individuals and if once an individual
accepts a variant, it replaces this variant only rarely or never. Thus, an indi-
vidual who copies an old individual will tend to adopt a behavior that has
withstood a lifetime of selection pressures and will tend to be better than a
variant adopted by an individual who did not make it to old age. It may seem
that such a strategy is an evaluative, not a structural solution, but no evalu-
ations need take place in order to realize such a strategy. For example, it could
be that young individuals attend school to learn some set of skills and that the
teachers are old. The students need not evaluate whether their teachers are old
(or the bearers of good variants). The society is simply structured in such a way
that the teachers from which the young learn are old.
Another behavioral strategy structural solution is copy individuals of highest
rank. This is a solution if the highest ranked individuals tend to be the fittest
and the fittest individuals tend to possess the best cultural variants. This also
might seem like it is not a structural solution, since it would appear to require
discriminations based on rank. But this need not require any assessment of the
quality of the self or other. It might just be that the highest ranked individuals
occupy a unique spacio-temporal position in the group. For example, if the
highest ranked individual occupies the most conspicuous position within the
group, a young individual searching for a model will have a high probability of
copying this individual relative to other individuals within the group. This
difference in probabilities is not based on the discriminative abilities of the
copier – it is merely based on the structure of the society. A related solution is
referred to as ‘prestige-based guided variation’ by Henrich and Gil-White
(2001). Because there is a correlation between prestige and age (Simmons
1945), the rules copy prestigious individuals and copy old individuals will sanc-
tion the copying of many of the same individuals.
Another way to satisfy the constraint is to occasionally opt out of social
learning (and instead learn individually) or to socially learn from an individual
13 Horizontal transmission is transmission among individuals in the same generation. Oblique
transmission includes all transmission from one generation to the following generation that is not
vertical, i.e., that is not from biological parents to offspring.
14 For a more extensive discussion of learning strategies and their adaptiveness, see Laland
(2004).
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who opted out of social learning.15 The extent to which the Fundamental Con-
straint is satisfied can depend on the frequency of individual learning. Oneway of
introducing an advantageous variant into the population is to learn something
individually and act as a model for another individual. If none of the individuals
in a population learn on their own, if all merely copy each other, then the variants
will become less and less good for the organisms. This will shift the correlation
line in Figure 1 to the left as well as make it tend towards vertical, breaking the
connection between the fitness of the variants and their fitness impact on the
organisms. This frequency dependence becomes very important in rapidly
changing environments. In such environments, cultural variants rapidly lose
their benefit to the organisms (see Boyd and Richerson 1985). Thus, we would
expect that cultural systems in rapidly changing environmentswould include a lot
of individual learning. Opting out (or copying those who opt out) can be a
structural solution – individuals can opt out with some set frequency, not based
on their assessments of the quality of the variant or the bearer of the variant – but
it can also be an evaluative solution. Individuals can opt out if they judge that the
behaviors of the models are suboptimal, for example.
Evaluative solutions
Evaluative solutions fall into three categories, those that require the evaluation
of the self, others, or both. One example of a solution that requires an eval-
uation of the self is copy if dissatisfied. If an individual correctly assesses that it
is not doing well in some domain, it will tend to pay to copy a conspecific’s
behavior in this domain. A similar strategy is copy if uncertain. If an individual
is uncertain how to behave in some domain, copying a conspecific will tend to
be profitable. Evaluative solutions can be combined with structural solutions
for an even better solution. For example, the compound strategy copy old
individuals if uncertain is better than either copy if old or copy if uncertain.
A strategy that requires the evaluation of others (but not the self) is copy
successful individuals. This strategy satisfies the constraint only if successful
individuals tend to possess success endowing cultural variants. Since this is not
guaranteed, the better strategy is copy successful behaviors. It is often a lot
harder to determine which behaviors are successful than to determine which
individuals are successful.16 In the case of humans, it is a lot easier to tell which
farmers were successful (simply measure their yield) than to tell what it is that
made them successful – was it their seed stock, their fertilization, watering,
planting, or harvesting methods, or perhaps some combination of these?
15 This of course can occur only in facultative cultural systems. When an organism opts out of
social learning, it is likely to opt out in one or a few domains only. It is not necessary (and often not
possible) that it opt out of social learning altogether. Henrich and Boyd (1998) show that occa-
sional use of individual learning is beneficial since it helps in avoiding suboptimal traditions. See
Boyd and Richerson (1989) for models relating individual learning, social learning, and the
adaptiveness of culture.
16 This is an example of what Boyd and Richerson (1985) refer to as an indirect bias.
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Similarly, it often easier to tell that one group is doing better than another than
to identify which individuals in the group are responsible for this success.
When someone wins a Nascar race, we can confidently say that the team did
well. But what gave the team the winning edge? Was it the driver, the design of
the car, the mechanics? This is much more difficult to discern.
A related strategy that requires an evaluation of both others and the self is
copy if better. Like the copy if successful strategy, there are two versions, one
involves copying the behaviors of individuals that are doing better. The other
(more cognitively challenging) version is copy better behaviors.
The above evaluative solutions operate by accepting good variants and
expunging bad variants. But there is another way to satisfy the Fundamental
Constraint: the adaptive transformation (i.e., guided mutation) of existing
variants. The ability to transform variants can be divided into two classes,
those based on concrete information and those based on abstract information. I
will call these concrete transformations and abstract transformations. Concrete
transformations are transformations based on concrete sensory feedback. If a
rat eats a food item and subsequently gets sick, it will probably modify its diet
to eliminate this kind of food. This is an example of concrete transformation.
If, on the other hand, the rat ‘‘considers’’ foraging in a traditional exposed
area, ‘‘judges’’ it to be too dangerous, then ‘‘decides’’ to forage only in more
protected areas, the rat will have accomplished an abstract transformation.17
Another distinction can be drawn between transformations based on prox-
imate feedback and those based on distal feedback. The above example of the
rat getting sick following its eating a food item is a case of proximate feedback
– the eﬀect quickly follows its cause. If, on the other hand, a rat chooses a
mate, there will not be proximate feedback on whether this was a good choice
or not – the oﬀspring produced by the pair might be genetically inferior, but
even if this inferiority is detected, the connection between this inferiority and
the mate is not based on proximate sensations.
Humans are experts at abstract transformations and are able to eﬀect
them based not just on distal eﬀects that actually occurred, but on the
representations of what might occur.18 Although humans can effect such
17 To what extent the rats are able to perform the actions in scare quotes in the previous sentence
is questionable. See the arguments in the following section for the rarity of culture.
18 Dennett (1995) makes the distinction between Darwinian creatures – creatures with rigid
behavioral responses, Skinnerian creatures – creatures that blindly try different responses, some of
which get reinforced, increasing the probability of the reinforced behavior, Popperian creatures –
creatures with an inner selective environment that can pre-sort the good behaviors from the bad
without having to try out the bad behaviors, and Gregorian creatures – the subset of Popperian
creatures able to import mind tools to be used in both the generation and testing of behavioral
variants. Skinnerian creatures are presumably only able to make concrete transformations, whereas
at least some Popperian creatures (and perhaps all Gregorian creatures) are able to make abstract
transformations. Just because a creature is able to make abstract transformations does not mean
that it can make them in all domains. It is likely that any creature capable of abstract transfor-
mations in some domains (such as navigating a hillside) will have domains in which the behavior is
rigid or not readily transformable (such as increasing one’s pulse in the presence of a predator).
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transformations, part of my argument for the rarity of culture (as we will see
below) is that abstract, especially abstract distal, transformations are outside of
the cognitive abilities of most species.
The form and distribution of cultural systems
The solutions presented in the previous section are all ways of ﬁltering out or
improving deleterious cultural variants and retaining good ones. This can oc-
cur either through the structural or evaluative solutions (or both). Because of
this limited domain of solutions to the Fundamental Constraint, one would
predict a limited domain of cultural systems in nature.19
One way to see why the Fundamental Constraint predicts that culture,
especially complex, cumulative culture should be rare is the following argu-
ment: cultural transmission is either purely vertical or it is not. If it is purely
vertical, then the Fundamental Constraint is automatically satisﬁed (as we saw
above). But this comes at a cost. If the transmission is purely vertical, then (1)
cultural inheritance acts like genetic inheritance, which implies that (2) indi-
viduals cannot incorporate innovations from any conspeciﬁcs except biological
parents, (3) good variants cannot spread through the population except
through the fecundity of the lineage bearing the variant, and (4) bad variants
cannot be replaced by other, better variants from the population, i.e., bad
variants can only be eliminated through behavioral plasticity or natural
selection on the bearer of the variant. Additionally, (5) if the majority of the
cultural mutations are bad (which we would expect unless the variation is
directed), then if the cultural system has a slow mutation rate, cultural change
is rather slow and it is unlikely that such a cultural system would be favored
over a genetic system. If it has a rapid mutation rate, the species would have to
have a high fecundity in order to purge the deleterious variants or would have
to have a robust system of adaptive transformation. In sum, there is a limited
space in which vertical cultural transmission would be favored over genetic
transmission.
In spite of these restrictions on vertical cultural transmission, there are cases
of adaptive vertical inheritance. Many of these cases involve transformations of
some sort (e.g., directed mutation) that increases the adaptiveness of the cul-
tural variants. One example of adaptive vertical transmission is diet inheri-
tance, which occurs in many species from bears to butterﬂies. One well-studied
case is diet inheritance in rats (Galef 1977), which I discussed above. One thing
that makes the inheritance of diet in rats adaptive is that the offspring inherit
19 Depending upon how ‘culture’ is defined, one might think that there is either a lot or a little
culture in nature. The ‘all non genetic transmission’ definition of culture makes culture ubiquitous,
since cytoplasmic inheritance becomes cultural. But what is undoubtedly rare in nature is complex,
cumulative culture. Some have even argued that humans are the only species that exhibits cu-
mulativity (e.g., Tomasello et al. 1993). The Fundamental Constraint and the limited ways that it
can be satisfied can help explain why this kind of culture is not more common in nature.
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preferences for what the mother is eating during gestation.20 This is the diet of
an adult and is the result of a mixture of the diet inherited from her mother plus
a healthy dose of trial and error learning (concrete transformation – i.e., di-
rected mutation). The trial and error learning presumably eliminated most of
the deleterious dietary preferences she inherited as well as updated the diet to
the changing environment, thus aligning her fitness with the fitness of her
cultural variants (and thereby satisfying the Fundamental Constraint).
If the transmission is not purely vertical, then it incorporates oblique or
horizontal transmission (or both). If the system incorporates horizontal
transmission, then (1)–(5) are not the case: an individual is potentially able to
replace any bad variants it has with better versions from conspeciﬁcs, cultural
change can be rapid, and the variants received from individuals in the same
generation will tend to be more up-to-date. But as with vertical transmission,
there is a cost. Along with the beneﬁts of horizontal transmission comes the
lack of automatic satisfaction of the Fundamental Constraint. In order for the
Fundamental Constraint to be satisﬁed, structural or evaluative solutions must
be in place. Are there structural solutions that satisfy the constraint in the case
of horizontal transmission? All of the structural solutions listed above (with the
exception of opting out and the possible exception of copy individual of highest
rank) make the system effectively into a vertical or oblique system, e.g., a
horizontal transmission system that adopts the rule copy old individuals has
effectively changed into a vertical/oblique system. Because there are few
structural solutions that still allow horizontal transmission, evaluative solu-
tions will generally be needed. A rule like copy if better, if followed, will satisfy
the constraint. But what are the cognitive requirements for such a rule? Al-
though this is of course a difficult question to answer, it is probable that for
some kinds of variants the cognitive requirements are substantial. The
organisms need to resist the seduction of intrinsically attractive variants and
adopt new ones only if they are better than what they already have. If proxi-
mate feedback is available, concrete transformations can be used to keep the
organisms from possessing deleterious variants. But if we include the larger
domain of variants with distal or hypothetical effects, a much more subtle and
powerful kind of mechanism for sorting good variants from bad is required,
something that humans constantly employ, but other species may not have to
the degree necessary for them to satisfy the Fundamental Constraint. This
sorting mechanism may go a long way toward explaining the rarity of culture
in nature and the uniqueness of human complex, cumulative culture.
Oblique transmission represents an intermediate case between vertical and
horizontal transmission. If the transmission is oblique only, or if it is oblique
and vertical, then the Fundamental Constraint will tend to be satisﬁed if the
variants aﬀect survivorship. An evaluative solution like ‘‘copy the best
behavior’’ can work well in an oblique transmission system, since the best
variants from each generation can be selected and the worst variants can expire
20 Galef has also shown that there is horizontal transmission of diet in rats (e.g., Galef 1988).
412
with the death of their bearers. But oblique transmission also suﬀers from
modiﬁed versions of (2)–(5) above, which eliminates a number of the beneﬁts
that culture can provide: in oblique systems, individuals cannot incorporate
innovations from any conspeciﬁcs except individuals from their parent’s gen-
eration, which means that any good variants that arise must wait until the next
generation to spread through the population. If the environment is rapidly
changing, what was an adaptive variant a generation ago may no longer be
adaptive. Furthermore, without evaluative solutions (like the ‘copy the best
behaviors’ example above) variants that are bad for their bearers can become
popular (e.g., celibacy). Thus, for many cases, oblique systems will require
evaluative solutions in order to satisfy the Fundamental Constraint.
In sum, vertical inheritance systems will generally satisfy the constraint but
will rarely be favored over genetic transmission except in systems involving
adaptive transformations (directed mutations). Horizontal and oblique systems
do not automatically satisfy the constraint and generally require evaluative
solutions in order to be adaptive. The rarity of these kind of systems in nature
can in part be explained by the rarity of cognitive systems capable of these
kinds of evaluations.
Conclusions
We have seen that there is a Fundamental Constraint on the evolution of
culture and that this constraint must be satisﬁed for a cultural system – or any
kind of inheritance system – to be adaptive. This requirement strongly limits
the variety of cultural systems that can evolve, and thus helps to explain why
there is not more culture in nature. This is the case because the two ways to
satisfy the constraint – structural and evaluative solutions – are often either no
better than genetic inheritance or require advanced cognitive abilities. Most
animal species are expected to be able to perform only concrete transforma-
tions. In order to take full advantage of a cultural system, the individuals
would need to be able to perform abstract transformations. This points to a
key empirical question: What does it take to evolve the ability to make abstract
cultural transformations? In the case of the origins of human culture, the
central question is: What did it take for our ancestors to evolve the ability to
make abstract cultural transformations? Any account of the origins and evo-
lution of culture – human or infrahuman – will have to be an account of how
the Fundamental Constraint is satisﬁed.
Acknowledgements
I thank Robert Brandon and Alex Rosenberg for reading and commenting on
multiple drafts of this paper. I also thank Natalie Gold, David Kaplan Steve
Nowicki, Kim Sterelny, Peter Richerson, and an anonymous reviewer for their
413
helpful comments and suggestions. A previous version of this paper was pre-
sented at the 2005 meeting of the International Society for the History, Phi-
losophy, and Social Studies of Biology.
References
Boyd R. and Richerson P.J. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. University of Chicago
Press, Chicago.
Boyd R. and Richerson P.J. 1989. Social learning as an adaptation. Lect. Math. Life. Sci. 20: 1–26.
Byrne R.W. and Russon A.E. 1998. Learning by imitation: A hierarchical approach. Behav. Brain
Sci. 21(5): 667–721.
Castro L. and Toro M.A. 2004. The evolution of culture: From primate social learning to human
culture. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 101(27): 10235–10240.
Dennett D.C. 1995. Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. Simon &
Schuster, New York.
Galef B.G. 1988. Communication of information concerning distant diets in a social, central-place
foraging species: Rattus Norvegicus. In: Zentall T.R. and Galef B.G. (eds.), Social Learning:
Psychological and Biological Perspectives., Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, pp. 119–
140.
Galef B.G. 1977. Mechanisms for the social transmission of food preferences from adult to
weanling rats. In: Barker L.M., Best M. and Domjan M. (eds.), Learning Mechanisms in Food
Selection, Baylor University Press, Waco, TX, pp. 123–150.
Henrich J. 2004. Demography and cultural evolution: How adaptive cultural processes can produce
maladaptive losses - the Tasmanian case. Am. Antiq. 69(2): 197–214.
Henrich J. and Boyd R. 1998. The evolution of conformist transmission and the emergence of
between-group differences. Evol. Human Behav. 19(4): 215–241.
Henrich J. and Gil-White F.J. 2001. Evolution of prestige: Freely conferred deference as a mech-
anism for enhancing the benefits of cultural transmission. Evol. Human Behav. 22(3): 165–196.
Laland K.N. 2004. Social learning strategies. Learn. Behav. 32(1): 4–14.
Ramsey G. 2006. Block fitness. Stud. Hist. Philos. Biol. Biomed. Sci. 37: 484–498.
Ramsey G., Bastian M.L. and van Schaik C. Animal innovation defined and operationalized
(submitted).
Reader S.M. and Laland K.N. (eds), 2003. Animal Innovation. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Simmons L.W. 1945. The Role of the Aged in Primitive Society. Yale University Press, London.
Sterelny K. 2006. The evolution and evolvability of culture. Mind Lang. 21(2): 137–165.
Thorpe W.H. 1963. Learning and Instinct in Animals: New ed. Methuen, London.
Tomasello M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
Tomasello M., Kruger A.C. and Ratner H.H. 1993. Cultural learning. Behav. Brain Sci. 16(3): 495–
552.
Whiten A. and Ham R. 1992. On the nature and evolution of imitation in the animal kingdom.
Adv. Study Anim. Behav. 21: 239–283.
414
